
BACKGROUND
George
Armstrong “Autie” Custer was born in New Rumley, Ohio on 05 December 1839
and his family moved to Monroe, Michigan when he was ten years old.
Custer went off to West Point Military Academy and graduated last in his
class of 64 attendees in 1861. He participated in the First
Battle of Manassas and later served on the staffs of both Generals McClellan and
Pleasanton. On 26 June 1863, he was appointed
to the "Brevet" rank of Brigadier General of Volunteers and placed in
command of the 2nd Brigade (Michigan), 3rd Cavalry Division at Gettysburg.
He then commanded the 3rd Cavalry Division in the Shenandoah Valley campaign,
Fisher's Hill and at Five Forks. By now his daring exploits were common
knowledge and he had gained the attention of the press. His complete disregard
for his own safety was also well known, and there those that accused him of also
having no regard for the safety of his men either. Be that as it may, in April
1865, he was promoted to Major General of Volunteers. His rapid climb to
generalship may well have been due, in no small measure, to his wild cavalry
charges and completely eccentric military methods of combat, yet he delighted
the media and he emerged from the war without a scratch. This may have been a
somewhat dubious distinction when one considers that the "Boy General"
had the highest casualty rate of any Union divisional commander in the Civil
War. However, after the war, there was no need for national heroes, and he, like
Major Reno, Captain Benteen and many other high ranking officers, was stripped
of his battlefield commission and returned to the regular army as a captain. It
should be noted that during the Civil War, his rapid climb in rank did not
endear him in the hearts of many of his fellow officers, who considered him
foolhardy, egotistical, incompetent and completely lacking of any type of
any trace of military professionalism. Two officers, who held this belief, and
who would be ordered to serve under Custer in the 7th Cavalry, were none other
then Major Reno and Captain Benteen.
In 1866 , he was assigned to the newly organized 7th U.S. Cavalry, then stationed at Fort Riley, Kansas. While there, the Regimental Commander, Colonel Andrew J. Smith, was rarely present and so it was left up to Custer to "whip the Regiment into shape". Promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel and placed "second in command" of the Regiment, there were only a few marked clashes with the Sioux and Cheyenne Indians, one notable example being the disgraceful massacre of many innocent Cheyenne women and children on the Washita River on 27 November 1868. Of note is that one of the survivors of the Washita Massacre was a youthful and dynamic Cheyenne lad, who would play a key role in Custer's defeat at the Little Bighorn River eight years later. His Indian name was was "Tashunca-uitco" but to the White Man he was known as "Crazy Horse" (1849-1877).
A PROMISE BROKEN
In 1868, following Red Clouds War, the Fort Laramie Treaty was enacted between the Indians and the government of the United States that created (on paper) the Great Sioux Reservation. This land, which included the Black Hills of Dakota, was (and still is) sacred territory where for generations the Sioux sought respite, held spiritual ceremonies and buried their loved ones. The government confirmed the treaty by adding...."From this day forward all war between the parties to this agreement shall for ever cease. The government of the United States desires peace, and its honor is hereby pledged to keep it......and the United States now solemnly agrees that no persons, except those herein designated and authorized so to do, and except such officers, agents, and employees of the government as may be authorized to enter upon Indian reservations in discharge of duties enjoined by law, shall ever be permitted to pass over, settle upon, or reside in the territory described in this article". It was also the Oglala Sioux War Chief Red Cloud that stated.....They (the Whites) made us many promises.....more than I can remember, but they never kept but one.....they promised to take our land, and they took it."
In 1874, during an expedition in onto the Sioux
reservation and into the Black Hills, by Custer’s 7th Cavalry, which openly
violated the 1868 treaty, gold was discovered in the Black Hills. Unfortunately
for all concerned, someone forgot to make it clear that the Black Hills
were sacred to the Sioux and its discovery resulted in a stampede of miners into
the sacred land. As to be expected, this outright "invasion" (and
nothing less) was adamantly resisted by the Sioux Nation and justifiably so.
Bloody raids on the miners camps, and pitched skirmishers resulted. To quill the
situation, the US government attempted to purchase the Black Hills but this
tactic failed. In late 1875 the government issued an ultimatum to the
Sioux to either return to their reservations by 31 January1876 or a military
expedition would be sent into the area to force their return. As to be expected,
many of the tribal leaders,
namely Sitting Bull, Rain-in the-Face, Gaul and Crazy Horse, refused to go back
to the "reservation" while their sacred lands were being pillaged by
the Whites. In
the spring of 1876 a three-pronged army campaign was launched to bring the
Indians back to their reservations. while during that same time frame, the
Sioux, Northern Cheyenne, and Arapaho Nations gathered in the vicinity of
Rosebud Creek and the Little Big Horn River.
THE LITTLE BIGHORN CAMPAIGN PLAN
To "relocate" the Indians Tribes from the Plains back to the reservation, General Alfred H. Terry was placed in overall command of an Army campaign into the Black Hills. His plan was remarkably simple. The army was to move against the Indians in three columns and to trap them at the Little Bighorn Valley or Rosebud Creek through a coordinated attack from three directions. General Terry's Column, with Custer's Regiment in advance, was to move westward, aboard the steamer "Far West", from Fort Abraham Lincoln while General Gibbon's column moved eastward from Fort Ellis. The third column, under General Cooke, was to move northward from Fort Laramie, with all three elements converging on the large Indian camp late on the day on Monday, 26 June 1876. Timing was everything but most important, surprise was paramount. None of the "hostiles" were to be given the opportunity to break camp and flee into Canada. So when Custer's command (730 strong with about 45 scouts) disembarked from the Steamer "Far West", on 22 June, and moved inland from the Yellowstone River, he had no specific written orders and only one verbal directive....."Let no Indians take flight northward". Custer was on his own.
The going was tough and the pack trains slowed their advance, but Custer and the 7th Cavalry pushed onward toward the Little Bighorn that rested some 50 miles southward. All was going well until 24 June. On that day, the Arikara and Osage scouts notified Custer that a group of Indians were seen pilfering through some of the discarded supplies and that a another party of Indians, identified as Sioux warriors, were following the column. The element of surprise, so vital to the success of the entire military operation, was now lost! At that moment, and having no idea of the actual strength of Indian village, Custer was faced a serious dilemma. His presence now discovered, and there was little doubt that word of his force was being carried back to the Sioux encampment. Did he wait for the main columns, and in doing so allow the Indians to break camp and escape or attack.
On 24 June, the Arikara and Osage scouts identified a party of Sioux following them. The Sioux fled when approached and Custer did not want any of the Sioux encampment to escape. On the night of 24 June, Custer outlined the plan for the next day. When the his regiment reached the Sioux encampment on 25 June 1876, Custer made a decision to attack and fight the Indians. Astute military protocol of the day (and even today) demanded two things. First, the mission comes first with a consideration of losses being secondary. And second, despite orders (and remember, there were none) the situation, as it unfolds "in the field" takes precedence over any table top plan with the commander having the authority to take such actions he deems necessary. If his actions are rewarded with victory, then he is labeled a gallant and brilliant tactician. If his actions are a disaster, he's tagged a fool and better he had died in battle.
A CALCULATED RISK
Custer, now knowing that the village lay only 15 miles away, but still not aware that the number of warriors encamped therein numbered three times his strength, he decided to attack before the camp could be alerted and make good their escape. Given his previous attacks against the integrity of the President Grant's Secretary of War, William W. Belknap, who was accused of accepting bribes from companies licensed to trade with the Indians, Custer was keenly aware of who would be held to blame if these Indians broke camp and fled to safety northward. Though warned of the excessive numbers of Sioux, Northern Cheyenne, and Arapaho warriors that faced him, Custer was convinced that his "Custer's Luck", that had served him so well in the Civil War, was better chanced then facing a courts martial, and the President's wrath, at being the cause of the campaigns failure. So, on the evening of 24 June, Custer decided on a plan of attack.
At about noon, on 25 June, Custer divided his meager force into three "wings" thereby emulating the original plan of an attack from three different directions in order to prevent an escape. He dispatched Captain Frederick Benteen, with Troops D, H, and K consisting of 5 officers and 110 men, in a southwesterly direction to prevent an escape to the south. He sent Major Marcus Reno westward toward the village, with Troops A, G, and M consisting of 11 officers, 131 troopers, and most of the approximately 35 scouts. Major Reno's mission was to attack the camp, and threaten the safety of the Indian women and children thereby provoking an engagement and preventing an attempt to flee. Captain McDougall was placed in command of Troop B and remained in the rear with the pack train. Custer himself had direct command of Troops C, E, F, I, and L, numbering 13 officers, 198 men (7 of whom would eventually be detached before the "last stand") as well as five civilians: two of Custer's relatives, a newspaper reporter, and two scouts. He would sweep on a northwest route and while Major Reno attacked from the east, he (Custer) would swoop down on the encampment from the north. (See map on bottom of page)
A PLAN GONE BAD
As planned, Benteen rode of with his column as Reno's column (Battalion) attacked the southern end of the village at about 2:30 PM. Unfortunately, lacking the nerve to press on forward when enjoined in battle, he halted his charging men and ordered them to dismount. After 10 minutes of pure chaos, he ordered them to remount (some unfortunate Troopers not hearing the order) and beat a hasty and totally disorganized, retreat into the timber and brush along the river. When that position proved indefensible, he and his men made a panicky retreated uphill to the bluffs east of the river, pursued hotly by a mix of Cheyenne and Sioux under Chief Gaul. Here, on what would become known as Reno's Hill, a hasty defense was established. The time was now about 3:30 PM.
Upon receiving a message from Custer to "Come on...big village, be quick...bring pacs..." (from Trooper Martin, the last White Man to see Custer alive), Captain Banteen turns his Battalion around and heads directly northward (and towards the sounds of gunfire) without actually knowing who is involved or what is going on. At this moment Benteen was convinced that he was sent out some "boon-doggle mission" in a deliberate effort by Custer to prevent him (Benteen) from sharing in the glory of battle. He wasted no time coming upon Reno's shattered command, who are now hunkered down atop Reno Hill (the Bluffs). Benteen's timely arrival probably happened just in time to prevent Reno's shattered Battalion from suffering the same fate as Custer's column. Reinforced by the arrival of Captain McDougall and the pack train, consisting of another 14 officers and 340 troopers, Benteen quickly and efficiently organized an all-around defense. Reno, by a number of actual eye-witness accounts, was "totally out of control and unfit to command" thereby "forcing" Captain Benteen to assume overall command of all the entrenched Troopers atop Reno Hill. During this period, heavy gunfire was also heard coming from the north, but due to the swirling dust and distance (about 3½ miles) Benteen rightly concentrated on reinforcing Reno's badly wounded battalion rather than continuing on towards the gunfire and possibly sacrificing the entire Regiment. In defense of Captain Benteen's decision, he was still unaware of the exact location of Custer's command or his commander's serious situation. The time was now about 4 PM in the afternoon.
CUSTER'S LAST STAND
Lieutenant Colonel Custer and his Battalion, in the meantime, had run into a virtual hornet's nest. Believing Major Reno to be engaging the Indians as planned, he (Custer) ordered two companies to assault the village from the north. The assault failed, as near 4,000 warriors, led by Two Moons and Crazy Horse, rolled over the majority of his Battalion, separating the various Troops and dealing with the frantic soldiers piece-meal. The time was about 3:45 PM. Not knowing the fate of Major Reno's Battalion, while frantically searching the distant hills for signs of help from Captain Benteen Battalion, Custer fell back further north to a small hill and threw up a hasty defense on what is now called Custer Hill. Within a semi-circular defense of some 29 dead or dying horses, the last of approximately 39 Troopers of Custers initial command of 264 set about to sell their lives dearly.
Within a short period of time, Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer, the Boy General and flamboyant Hero of the Civil War, along with the remainder of his column (Battalion) were annihilated by the full might of the Sioux, Northern Cheyenne, and Arapaho warriors. I believe (though no one really knows) that it was all over (except the sporadic shooting into the bodies of the slain soldiers) by 4:30 PM.
After Custer's Battalion had been destroyed, the Sioux, Northern Cheyenne, and Arapaho warriors turned their attentions to Benteen and Reno's defensive position atop Reno Hill from about 9: PM that evening until the next day (26June). Several attacks were repulsed and Captain Benteen's leadership can be directly credited for saving the remainder of the 7th US Cavalry from sharing Custer's fate. On 26 June, General Terry's force was seen approaching from the north and the Indians, realizing that the force was too strong, broke off their assault and withdrew. Atop Reno's Hill, the wounded were given what treatment was available from General Terry's Surgeons but medical aid was severely limited since 2 of the Rregiment's 3 Surgeons had been with Custer's Battalion.
THE DAY AFTER
In the search for
survivors of Custer's forces, not one of the 264 troopers in Custer's Battalion
were found alive (and infact, some were not found at all). Among the dead, the
bodies of 5 of the "Custer Clan" were found. They were Custer's
brother-in-law Captain James Calhoun, Custer's two brothers, young Boston (who
went along for a little glory) and Captain Tom Custer, a 2-time Civil War Medal
of Honor awardee. The last body found on "Last Stand Hill" belong to
Custer's nephew Autie Reed. Both
Boston and Autie were civilians.
Only one horse was found still alive, the others not killed being taken by the
Indians, and he had seven arrows in his body. The horse was , named Comanche, a gelding ridden by Captain Keogh, one of Custer's
officers. As for fallen troopers, most were stripped and their bodies
brutally mutilated by (mostly) squaws and children. Captain Tom Custer's body
was also stripped and mutilated, his heart cut out of his chest. Oddly,
Lieutenant Colonel Custer's body was also stripped but neither it was neither scalped or mutilated.
Some believe this was due to the fact that he (Custer) had an Indian mistress
who was at the camp when the attack was made. Others contend that "Long
Hair's" (another name given Custer) body was left unmutilated out off some
sort of respect for his (Custer's) prowess and courage in battle. If there is
any creditability to the first explanation there is none to the second. Prior to
the battle, Custer had his long golden hair cut short and his mustache trimmed.
Additionally, most of his officers were dressed in the same fashion as
Lieutenant-Colonel Custer and few, if any, of the attacking warriors knew
who he was. so was was his body spared ? Another suggestion made was that he
shot himself rather than suffer a far slower and more brutal death. These folks
contend that the Sioux and Cheyenne
view a person who commits suicide as being crazy and that it is "bad
medicine" to mutilate the body of a crazy person. Whatever the reason, if
there really is one, to this day no one knows the real reason they left his body intact.
THE AFTERMATH
True to form, the participants of any battle in which their army looses, are criticized whether they survive or not. The same holds true for those that took part in the Little Bighorn campaign. The leaders of the Sioux and Cheyenne's, though completely justified in their actions, were hunted down by Troopers to avenge the death of their comrades. Sitting Bull was pursued into Canada, and Crazy Horse was killed by a bayonet when he was finally prevailed upon to come to Fort Robinson, Nebraska in 1877. The rest of the noble clan were forced back onto the reservations.
Major Reno was accused of misconduct during the battle but beat the rap only to be accused of striking a junior officer and being drunk on duty and summarily discharged from the army in 1880 for "conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline". It should be noted here that there were still many in "high office" that admired "General" Custer. To his death, Major Reno defended his actions.
Unfortunately, Captain Benteen's career suffered much the same fate as that of Major Reno. Promoted to Major in the Ninth Cavalry in 1882, he was tried by court-martial for a number of charges of drunkenness on duty and conduct unbecoming an officer in 1887. He was convicted of most of the charges against him, and sentenced to dismissal from the Army. However, clemency was granted by President Grover Cleveland and he was suspended from active service for one year. He retired shortly thereafter and said nothing more of his involvement in the battle.
As for Custer, General Sheridan criticized him for the decision to divide his men into three groups. He further stated that after their "seventy mile" journey, Custer's men were too tired to fight effectively. He further stated that Custer had also made a mistake in developing a plan of attack on the false assumption that the Indians would attempt to escape rather than fight the soldiers. Both Benteen and Reno, in turn, accused Custer of virtually the same thing and being a glory seeking, egotistical, incompetent fool. Most people today agree. It should be noted here, that unlike Benteen and Reno, George Armstrong Custer was not alive to defend his actions. Be that as it may, no one can deny that Lieutenant-Colonel George Armstrong Custer has taken their his place in history, and had he lived, this may not have been the case. His glorious end in the Little Bighorn Valley saw to this. Loved, hated, or admired, we have to recognize that he was a brave soldier, nothing more and nothing less. Whether he was out-numbered or out-gunned matters not. In the face of over-whelming odds, if he actually knew they existed, his decision to attack, be it for glory or an attempt to save his career, has little historical relevance. History is final and does not allow for change or creditable dispute. For history cannot be changed, whether we like it or not and all that is left up to us to do is to interpret and debate its outcome. The only certainty is that, at the Battle of Little Bighorn, the Custer Myth of Invincibility abruptly ended.............or did it ?